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None come to mind 
OVERVIEW The Darwinian worldview, whereby organisms evolve by a process of natural and 
sexual selection, has come to permeate biological science, and to varying degrees the social 
sciences, with anthropology, psychology and economics the disciplines most influenced. 
Criminology has remained little touched by Darwinian thinking. This essay describes and refutes 
common criticisms of the application of evolutionary theory in the social sciences, and sets out 
some possible points of contact between evolutionary theory and crime prevention. The policy 
recommendations which may be tentatively made by drawing on the meagre volume of relevant 
research conducted to date are diverse and unlikely to offend liberal sensibilities.    
MAIN TEXT 
Key Issues and controversies 
Evolution is the process whereby attributes of plants or animals, including people, change over 
generations as a result of selection pressures operating on random genetic mutations. Organisms 
best adapted to their environment (i.e. most equipped to survive and bring their offspring to 
reproductive maturity), thereby come to feature in increasing numbers within the population.  
While the evidence base for evolution is seen as overwhelming by the great majority of scholars in 
the life sciences (see Coyne 2009), the theory remains controversial for three reasons. First, it may 
be rejected because its account of the origins of life is at odds with that of major religious texts. 
Second, the notion of ‘survival of the fittest’ (not a quotation from Darwin) is seen as the 
theoretical undergirding for eugenics, the Holocaust and subsequent horrors in the name of 
‘ethnic cleansing’. The third reason is the erroneous ascription of biological determinism to 
Darwinian thought.  
The first reason for rejection is not liable to challenge by evidence and will not be discussed save 
to affirm the right of people to their own theology. The second reason stems from Herbert 
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Spencer’s perversion of Darwinian thought and should not preclude an open-minded 
consideration of the implications of evolutionary thinking for crime and criminality. Darwin’s own 
view (Darwin, 1871) was that the intentional neglect of the weak and helpless was a “certain and 
great present evil” (p169). The third reason is simply wrong, with large human brains offering 
diversity and flexibility of behaviour consistent with Darwinian purposes (see Pagel 2012).    
If evolution were to be accepted as a true account of the shaping of organisms’ attributes, the 
implications for criminology are no less profound than they are for the other social sciences.  
Readers wishing to consider evolutionary implications for social policy generally are referred to 
the website of The Evolution Institute, brainchild of the biologist David Sloan Wilson 
http://evolution-institute.org/.  The Institute’s foci include risky adolescent behaviour and other 
crime-relevant topics.   
 The key presumption of the theory of human evolution is that modern Homo sapiens represents 
the product of selection pressures operating on our forebears in the late Pleistocene era, known 
as the Era of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA). Since (excepting for a few remaining hunter 
gatherer communities) our environment is now very different from that of the EEA, there is a 
mismatch between the setting for which evolution shaped us and the setting in which we are 
required to function. The plausibility of this view is best illustrated by current obesity and diabetes 
epidemics, the consequences of dietary preferences established at a time when food availability 
favoured those ingesting protein and sugar-laden diets coming to prove disastrous in times of 
plenty (Gluckman and Hanson 2006).  
Criminologists are used to confronting the most predatory and socially disruptive of human 
actions, (plus those perhaps foolishly deemed by authorities of a particular culture and epoch as 
socially disruptive, hence for example legislation on sexual mores). But if one thinks of human 
behaviour as lying on a continuum from cruel predation to heroic altruism, things (at least to the 
writers) look somewhat different. The bulk of the relevant evolutionary literature characterises 
people as ultra-social, ‘super-cooperators’ (Nowak 2011). The term eusociality (deriving from the 
Greek prefix eu meaning good or real) represents a state of affairs in which some individuals 
reduce their own lifetime reproductive potential to raise the offspring of others. Eusociality 
underlies the most advanced forms of social organization and the ecologically dominant role of 
social insects and humans (see E.O.Wilson 2012). Wilson’s view (in common with other scholars) is 
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that communities require a majority of cooperators, with deviant ‘freeriders’ threatening 
community cohesion when constituting more than a small minority. Areas vary massively in rates 
of crime. Crime levels remain an important determinant of the decision to move home, especially 
for those with children and the affluent (see for example Katzman 1980). The Wilson view would 
imply a highly skewed small area distribution of crime rates and a ‘tipping point’ as those able to 
move away from an area do so.     
To return to the central notion of Homo sapiens as a super-cooperator, it will come as a surprise to 
many criminologists, together with believers in Original Sin, that the default setting for human 
nature in maturity seems to be cooperation with, and weak altruism towards, other people. With 
that changed perception comes the suspicion that criminology ought not to form a distinct 
discipline. If the overarching aim of applied social science is to foster cooperative social 
relationships, then there is a case for ceasing to see the task as one of reducing the number of 
outlier behaviours labelled as crime, and instead to see it as directing people towards the 
cooperative end of the continuum, wherever on that continuum they started, ie to nudge altruists 
as well as the selfish further towards the heroic altruism pole. This would possibly be achieved by 
a rapprochement with the emergent discipline known as positive psychology. This perspective 
(bear in mind its origins in clinical practice) seeks to make normal life more fulfilling rather than 
exclusively to treat mental illness. It emphasizes the importance of using the scientific method to 
determine how things go right (Seligman and Csikszentmihaly 2000). In the same way, 
reconfiguring research so that the prosocial-antisocial continuum is treated as such, rather than 
antisocial outliers being hived off for study by a separate discipline called criminology makes sense 
against the background of the raft of research on human eusociality. It should be stressed that 
evolutionary thinking is not the only route towards the incorporation of criminology within 
positive psychology. Indeed, religious and other obstacles mean that it may always be ‘the road 
less travelled’.  While the implications of what amounts to a paradigm shift in criminology are 
immense, that theme will not be pursued here. Rather, the bulk of what follows is restricted to the 
implications of evolutionary thought for criminology as currently conceived. 
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The Dunbar Number 
  
Put crudely, if one accepts the Darwinian account, we evolved to act locally. How local is local? 
The Dunbar number refers to the maximum number of other people with whom a person can 
maintain stable social relationships (Dunbar, 1992). Robin Dunbar found a relatively narrow band 
of group sizes with an average of 150. This number (plus or minus some) characterised group size 
among numerous contemporary hunter-gatherer groups, and also the average estimated size of 
Neolithic farming villages.  Modern comparisons were made with the size of military units. 
Whatever its evolutionary origins, the Dunbar number has major unexplored implications for 
designing conflict-minimal contemporary human settlements. We know that real differences in 
rates of crime are immense and that crime is a major reason for moving home amongst those who 
can afford to do so.   We know that certain street types are associated with low levels of crime 
(Johnson & Bowers, 2009) and the recent work of David Weisburd and colleagues at George 
Mason University have emphasised the need for small-scale, street segment analyses of crime 
levels (see Weisburd et al. 2012). What we have yet to do is to consider attributes of late 
Pleistocene settlements alongside contemporary variations in residential crime risk. For example, 
do sinuous cul=de-sacs of the kind identified by Johnson and Bowers as low in crime share line-of-
sight or other attributes with hunter-gatherer settlements?   The reader will think it unsatisfactory 
in an encyclopaedia entry to say what should be done rather than what has been done, and 
indeed it is. However it is inevitable given the lack of penetration of evolutionary thinking into 
contemporary criminology.  
Child abuse and parenthood 
Margo Wilson and Martin Daly have looked at violence (among other things) from a Darwinian 
standpoint for some thirty years. Their work provides an illustration of what was implicit in the 
foregoing text, namely that an evolutionary mindset leads one to ask different kinds of question 
from those typically encountered in criminology.  
For most, the killing of a child is the most heinous and distressing of all crimes (Adler and Polk, 
2001). It is mercifully rarer for children to be victims of homicide than adults. In England and Wales 
there will be approximately 110 child homicides per year from an average total number of 
5 
 
approximately 700 recorded homicides, roughly equating to 14% of all homicide victims 
(Brookman, 2005).  
The notion that your own family represents the greatest danger to your wellbeing was 
conventional wisdom in the 1960s, and that undifferentiated view is still held in some quarters to 
this day. It was obvious to Daly and Wilson that biological and step-parents should be separated in 
any analysis of abuse (including lethal abuse) of children. When this was done, it was found that 
rates of child homicide by step-parents were one hundred times or more greater than rates of child 
homicide by biological parents. In a nod to the eponymous fairy story, they called this the 
Cinderella Effect (Daly & Wilson, 1998).  
Daly and Wilson do not argue that killing the offspring of others is adaptive for humans, though it 
is for some other species, such as lions (see Packer and Pusey 1983) as a means whereby incoming 
males prevent females from investing in the care of the offspring of other males, and eliminating 
the partial contraceptive effect of lactation, thus maximising the period in which females may 
conceive their cubs. Rather they argue that nurturance tends to be given preferentially to one’s 
own offspring. Abuse and homicide are outliers. Most people don’t keep their step-daughters 
from going to balls or feed them poisoned apples. The Cinderella research has been much 
criticised, with Daly and Wilson defending their position persuasively (Daly & Wilson, 2007). They 
assert 
“Abundant confirmatory research has followed, such that the disproportionate victimisation of 
stepchildren is now the most extensively documented generalisation in the family violence 
literature. This… raises further questions, such as what explains variability in the magnitude of 
Cinderella effects between maltreatment types and locales, and whether the individual level 
predictors of abuse are the same for fathers, mothers, step-fathers and step-mothers. 
Unfortunately, progress on these important issues has been hindered by a relentless distraction: 
the manufacture of ‘controversy’ about whether Cinderella effects exist at all. We suspect that the 
reason for this nay-saying resides largely, though not entirely, in antipathy to the Darwinian world-
view and its application to Homo sapiens” (p383-384). 
Daly and Wilson write thus of their critics: 
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“From the perspective of two researchers on the receiving end of these attacks, a disturbing and 
sometimes perplexing element has been their incivility…. [our critics] are not just sceptical, they 
are angry, and we are still not entirely sure what they are angry about” (p396). 
 
Future Discounting and Crime 
Comparisons with ants and termites (the only other eusocial organisms) will be treated in some 
quarters with derision, but one is included here because it provides an arresting image to act as a 
mnemonic for the serious point subsequently made.  
‘Old-aged termites go out with a bang, it appears. While ageing, the insects brew a backpack of 
deadly chemicals, which they use to self-destruct when under attack, taking out any enemies with 
them… When the spotted termites were physically unable to defend themselves with their jaws, 
they would commit the ultimate sacrifice and burst a pouch on their backs, releasing a toxic liquid 
that quickly paralysed and killed any other termites it touched’(p14). 
 
The moral is: if you haven’t got long to go, make the most of what you have. It has long been 
asserted that offenders are liable to high levels of future discounting, characterised by the 
preference for short-term rewards over larger long-term rewards (Daly and Wilson 2005). They 
apply an evolutionary lens to the issue. They interpret future discounting in terms of realistic 
anticipation of future life. They found homicide to be most frequent amongst those with least to 
lose, unemployed and unmarried men, with divorced and widowed men reverting to higher rates 
of homicide. They interpret this in terms of the deployment of reproductive effort as a gamble. If 
one anticipates the non-trivial probability of an early death, or other form of removal from the 
ranks of the reproductively active, one chooses a strategy of attempting risky and frequent and if 
necessary coerced impregnation, and the pursuit of short-term reputation and the acquisition of 
status symbols by acquisitive crime. Wilson and Daly argue that life expectancy itself may be a 
psychologically salient determinant of risk-taking.  
Clearly linked to anticipations of future life is the decision known as ‘Dads or cads’, referring to the 
choice of reproductive strategy amongst males (Cashdan 1993).  Cads seek to impregnate as 
widely as possible, making no contribution to child-rearing. Dads stay with the woman or women 
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with whom they have conceived children. Cads will be the more effective survival vehicles if more 
of their children survive and reproduce. Otherwise the genes of Dads win out in the next 
generation. If Wilson and Daly are correct in placing life expectancy at the centre of strategy 
choice, the implications are clear in engendering hope of life and possible success in adolescents, 
especially adolescent males. This clearly has implications beyond the narrowly criminological.  
Domestic violence against women 
According to the 2009/10 British Crime Survey (BCS) seven per cent of women aged between 16 
and 59 years in England and Wales were victims of domestic abuse over the course of one year, 
the majority of the violence being ‘non-sexual’ abuse by a partner. Although only fourteen per 
cent of the total 2,087,000 violent incidents estimated by the BCS for that year were described as 
domestic violence, equivalent figures have been found to be up to five times higher where 
participant ‘self-completion’ was used. Domestic violence is ubiquitous and as such if we are 
working to prevent violent crime than we can best make inroads by focussing on intimate partner 
violence. For example, a study in England and Wales (1995-2000) showed that 30 per cent of all 
the homicides were ‘femicides’. Moreover, 57 per cent of these female victims were killed by an 
intimate (or ex-intimate) male sexual partner (Brookman, 2005).  
How can an evolutionary informed violence prevention strategy help reduce domestic violence? 
The first step, as always, should be to try and understand what is going on.  
Male ‘sexual jealousy’ is the most frequently given explanation for intimate partner violence (Daly 
and Wilson, 1988; Buss, 2005) and so will only be briefly mentioned here. For example, research 
consistently points to male on female violence as being primarily motivated by ‘jealousy/control’ 
on the part of the male. Put simply, men appear to use violence against women as a tactic to 
restrict their sexual behaviour, primarily as means of enforcing sexual (i.e. reproductive) 
‘exclusivity’ (Daly and Wilson, 1988). Fiona Brookman found that more than 80 per cent of 
femicides occurred where the female was either planning to leave her partner, or where he 
perceived her at least to have been ‘unfaithful’ with another sexual intimate, thereby 
compromising sexual exclusivity (Brookman, 2005).  
The foremost writer on this topic from an evolutionary perspective is Anne Campbell. Campbell 
makes the observation that in trying to explain the gender difference in crime the male-centred 
approach has dominated evolutionary psychology, where there appears to be a broad consensus 
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that the motivation to achieve status and ‘surplus resources’ is more critical to male than female 
reproductive success (Campbell, 2009). However, where a female-centred approach is taken a 
different perspective on male on female violence is achieved, where her most important proximal 
goal is to stay alive for her present (and future) off-spring (Campbell, 2009). 
Reproduction (and therefore sexual intercourse), poses more of a risk to female safety and 
survival than for males (Campbell, 2009), a kind of male-female genetic arms race in which 
females must evolve defences against the lethal potential of the sex drive of males. Intimate 
partner violence being one such defence, as when women kill it is more often than not an intimate 
(or previously intimate) partner who is the victim (Daly and Wilson, 1988).  
One practical lesson which the writers take from the Campbell perspective is the significance of 
women’s refusal to press charges or report violence committed against them by intimates. If their 
‘wired-in’ aim is survival with support (however flawed) this becomes more comprehensible. 
Perhaps the most common of police officer reactions to the victims of domestic violence who 
refuse to proceed down a criminal justice route is deep frustration, with a ‘why bother’ bottom 
line. Understanding the survival perspective, alongside legal changes to maximise chances of 
conviction even when the victim has become unwilling to proceed, seem justified.  
Epigenetics 
Evolutionary history is written in our genome but does not determine our behavior. Surely all 
competent scholars now accept that both genetic (nature) and environmental (nurture) factors 
play crucial interacting roles in human development. With regard to crime and anti-social 
behaviour, Moffitt and Caspi (2006) assert that familial inheritance is always both the result of 
genetic endowment and environment, but environments are made, and are often correlated with 
the dispositions of those who inhabit them. Of particular current interest is the gene variant 
MOAO which lowers the expression of the enzyme monoamine oxidase A and which seems 
implicated in violence. This relationship is stronger amongst maltreated children (see Caspi et al. 
2002). In brief, the effects of abuse are more pernicious in those with a particular genetic makeup. 
Rescue of all children from abuse is the only defensible child protection objective, but this is made 
more acute by the recognition that some of those children are genetically ‘primed’ towards 
violence. Failure to rescue such children from abuse has a consequence in their, and their victims’ 
later misfortunes. Despite a sense of urgency for the work of the Moffitt-Caspi team to be 
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incorporated into the child protection literature, as far as the writers have been able to determine 
after questioning relevant domain experts and practitioners, the implications of the Moffitt-Caspi 
work has not yet been translated into practice. So what are the implications for child protection? 
We may discard the notion of being indifferent to the parental practices imposed on those 
children whose genotypes afford them some protection against the acquisition of violent 
personalities! Rather it places an extra premium on ensuring as far as possible the quality of child-
care generally. Not to do so is effectively to collude in allowing preventable harm, which 
compounds the effects of the genetic lottery itself. A parallel may perhaps be drawn with 
phenylketonuria (PKU), where screening on neonates allows management, and avoidance of the 
progressive mental impairment which otherwise ensues.  
It has been speculated that the mechanism underlying the MAOA-abuse interaction may be 
epigenetic in nature. Epigenetics is concerned with the role that environments, including intra-
uterine environments, play in gene expression (see Francis, 2011; Wortley, 2011). This, both in the 
sense of responsivity to the cues which make primary crime reduction effective, and in the 
particular sense of empathy (or its lack) will be a crucial point of departure for research which 
seeks to link applied criminology and evolution.   
 
What has epigenetics got to do with evolution? The background to this question lies in very recent 
advances in genetics and related disciplines whereby much of what was hitherto regarded as ‘junk’ 
DNA, (ie DNA which does not code for proteins) in fact consists of a huge array of switches 
regulating gene expression. These switches can be thrown in pregnancy to yield enduring 
characteristics of the foetus, as was vividly revealed by the research following the Dutch ‘hungry 
winter’ famine of 1944, in which the phase of pregnancy during which women went without food 
had long term effects on the resulting child’s personality (Francis 2011).   
    
Evolution requires many generations to yield change. It would aid a foetus’ prospects to get some 
idea of what awaits outside the womb. Epigenetic changes allow the possibility of switching genes 
on or off depending upon the clues which the environment gives. This makes evolutionary sense 
for both in utero and childhood clues. In the Caspi-Moffitt research, parental aggression is an early 
indicator of how aggressive one needs to be to prosper in the adult world. This form of gene 
regulation seems to be primarily under matrilineal control and has likely evolved partly to co-
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ordinate in-utero development with maternal resource availability. The defensible next step will 
be to reanalyze longitudinal studies of criminality (the Cambridge study now incorporates data 
from three generations) to test epigenetic hypotheses. The literature on this topic continues to 
expand rapidly.  
 
Evolution without Tears: Natural Selection as Analogy 
Assuming the reader is wholly unpersuaded by everything written here so far, the writer’s 
remaining hope is that evolution as analogy may be seen as an unthreatening heuristic device. The 
approach of selecting amongst varying designs on the basis of performance is an engineering 
technique known as genetic programming, the title brilliantly obscuring from those who would 
otherwise reject the approach on religious grounds the fact that it is in essence a simulation of 
biological evolution used in product design. In any event, evolution as analogy requires a user only 
to consider that it represents a way that improvement could occur, not necessarily the way it did 
occur. In this way, the theological teeth are drawn!   
Perhaps the earliest proponent of this way of using Darwinian theory in relation to crime was Paul 
Ekblom, psychologist and polymath. He wrote in 1999   
“But natural evolution is not simply a matter of ‘medieval warfare’ with increasingly better-
armoured prey slogging it out against equally-improving armour-piercing capability of carnivores. 
The less dramatic struggle between plants and grazers is equally important (and may be a better 
model for property crime). The even longer struggle between pathogens and immune system has 
resulted in dynamic and adaptive strategies on each side. This has culminated in such 
sophisticated attackers as the HIV or smallpox viruses. Smallpox has about a hundred genes that 
interact with human defence mechanisms. In fact it has evolved counter-countermeasures to cope 
for example with a ‘virus alert’ chemical produced by infected cells, whose function is to warn 
nearby uninfected cells to activate their defences against virus attack.” (p29) 
 
Ekblom details the links between other evolutionary struggles and specific crime types (see Table 1 
below). The co-evolutionary analogy has more recently been taken up by Raphael Sagarin and 
Terence Taylor in their book Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World 
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(Sagarin and Taylor 2008) and applied to risk assessment in general and the threat of terrorism in 
particular.  
 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Conclusions 
Reluctance to apply an evolutionary perspective to problems of crime and criminality may be 
attributed to fundamentalist religious beliefs, the ascription of eugenic horrors of the past to 
Darwinian theory, and the notion of biological determinism erroneously laid at Darwin’s door. 
E.O.Wilson (1978) infamously wrote ‘genes hold culture on a leash’ (p172). While containing a 
grain of truth, it turns out that there are multiple leads, very long and very twisted (see Pagel 
2012).  
There are enough results of interest produced by researchers operating within a Darwinian 
framework to offer recommendations for crime reduction policy, alongside social policy of other 
kinds. It turns out that these recommendations are by and large recognisably liberal. They include 
the need to nourish pregnant women well, to seek to ensure that adolescents have a realistically 
long life expectancy and some anticipation of later success in order to minimise early pregnancies 
and profligate and coercive sex. It emphasises the absolute need to eliminate child abuse, given 
the genetic priming for violence of some so abused. It argues for recognition of the disincentive to 
report domestic abuse, given the pre-eminent family survival agenda of abused women. In the 
only clear enforcement item on the agenda, it argues for the particular monitoring of step-parents 
given their markedly greater prevalence of abuse against children within the home, always mindful 
of the fact that most step-parents behave well towards the children for whom they care. These 
recommendations represent the low-hanging fruit of the evolutionary perspective applied to 
crime, but given the marginality of such research within the discipline to date, it is surprising there 
is so much already. The wider question of whether the evolutionary perspective requires the 
abandonment of the discipline of criminology in favour of a perspective which encompasses the 
whole of the prosocial-antisocial continuum has been dodged here, but is probably crucial.   
Related Entries 
Age-crime curve, domestic violence, empathy and offending, evolutionary theories of criminal 
behaviour, genes crime and antisocial behaviours, genetic basis to self-control, innovation and 
crime prevention, Moffitt's developmental taxonomy of anti-social behaviour, prenatal and 
postnatal interventions 
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